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  • Cyber Liability Insurance for Churches: What It Covers and What It Doesn’t

    Cyber Liability Insurance for Churches: What It Covers and What It Doesn’t

    The treasurer is on the phone with the church’s insurance agent, and the question is simple enough. Two weeks ago the office administrator wired a payment to what turned out to be a fraudulent account — a convincing email, a changed set of bank details, a Friday afternoon. The money is gone, and the board wants to know whether the church is covered.

    There is a pause on the line, and then the sentence so many church treasurers have heard: Let me pull the policy and call you back.

    He calls the next morning. The church has property, general liability, directors and officers, and a crime policy with an employee dishonesty limit. None of them clearly respond — the employee dishonesty limit was written for theft by an employee, not for a payment an employee was tricked into authorizing, and nothing else in the file plainly addresses it. There is no cyber policy at all, because nobody ever asked and nobody ever offered.

    MissionDefend is not an insurer, a broker, or an agent. We do not sell, place, or recommend coverage, and no insurer or broker paid for, commissioned, or reviewed this article. If we ever list insurance partners on this site, those listings will be labelled as such and kept separate from editorial posts like this one. What follows is how these policies are generally structured, so you can have a better conversation with the person who does advise you. It is general information, not insurance or legal advice, and it is not a statement of what any particular policy or insurer covers.

    Why the policies you already have probably don’t respond

    Most churches carry a package built around buildings, injuries, and the conduct of leadership. Those policies were designed for physical loss and bodily harm, and their language usually reflects it. A property policy is generally written around damage to tangible property, and data generally isn’t tangible property. A general liability policy is generally written around bodily injury and property damage, and a member’s exposed giving history is typically neither. Whether that holds in your case is a question about your wording, not a rule — which is why the answer has to come from the policy in your file.

    For years there was real ambiguity here — the industry called it “silent cyber,” risk that a traditional policy neither clearly granted nor clearly excluded. Insurers didn’t like it either. The Government Accountability Office documented the response: insurers have been “adding exclusions to traditional lines of coverage and package policies with cyber endorsements to avoid any ambiguity that coverages would overlap with cyber policies.” Read that in the direction that matters to you — the trend has been toward removing the accidental coverage some organizations were relying on.

    The second reason churches believe they’re covered is a small cyber endorsement sitting on the package, a bolt-on with a modest limit, often added at renewal without discussion. It exists, so the answer to “do we have cyber?” is technically yes. Whether it responds to the loss you actually suffered, and for how much, only reading it will settle.

    The only reliable way to know what you have is to read your own policy with your broker, out loud, asking what each part would pay in a specific scenario.

    What a cyber policy actually contains

    Cyber coverage is not one thing. It’s a bundle of separately-limited parts in two families.

    First-party covers your own costs — what it takes to deal with the incident. Typically:

    Incident response and forensics. Specialists who work out what happened and shut it down. For a church with no IT department this is often the most valuable part, because it converts an unmanageable crisis into a phone number you call.

    Breach counsel — a lawyer who does this constantly, usually from a panel the insurer maintains.

    Notification costs — printing, mailing, a call center — for telling affected people, which state law may require, plus credit monitoring where it’s offered.

    Business interruption. Lost income while you can’t operate: a giving platform or church management system unavailable across two Sundays.

    Data restoration, the cost of rebuilding records, which is real work even when your backups are good.

    Cyber extortion, which in some policies includes a ransom payment and in others covers only negotiation and recovery. Ask which.

    Third-party liability covers what you owe other people — claims and lawsuits brought by members, donors, employees, or vendors whose information you held, plus regulatory proceedings and defense costs.

    The clause that matters most to churches

    The attacks in this series — the fake invoice, the changed vendor bank details, the payroll diversion, the urgent request that appears to come from the pastor — are not hacking in the technical sense. Nobody breaks anything. Somebody is persuaded to send money to the wrong account. In insurance language that’s social engineering fraud or funds transfer fraud, sometimes called deception fraud or fraudulent instruction.

    Coverage for it is very often a separate endorsement, and it very often carries a much lower sublimit than the rest of the policy. A sublimit is a cap inside a cap — a maximum for one specific type of loss, sitting below your overall policy limit.

    GAO’s 2021 review of the market illustrates the pattern, noting that risk factors “can result in lower coverage limits for certain perils, such as $250,000 for social engineering and wire transfer attacks on a policy with a $1 million total limit.” That’s one illustration from one report, not a standard, and your numbers may look nothing like it. The shape is the point: an organization that thinks of itself as holding a million-dollar policy may have a quarter of that available for the loss type it is most likely to experience.

    The endorsement usually carries conditions too, and they tend to look like the money rule this blog keeps returning to — the insurer may require that you verified the payment instruction by call-back to a number you already had, before the funds went out. If your own written procedure says you do that and you didn’t, the claim gets difficult.

    For scale, the FBI recorded 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with reported losses of $3,046,598,558 — which works out to roughly $123,000 per complaint.

    So the question for your broker is not “do we have cyber insurance?” It is: do we have social engineering and funds transfer fraud coverage, what is its sublimit, and what does the policy require us to have done before the money went out?

    Exclusions, conditions, and the application you sign

    Prior known circumstances. Policies commonly exclude incidents you knew about, or reasonably should have known about, before the policy started. Discovering a compromise and then buying coverage is not a way to get that incident paid for.

    War and infrastructure exclusions. Insurers have been tightening here to limit exposure to events that could hit thousands of policyholders at once. GAO notes that in November 2021 the Lloyd’s Market Association introduced specific exclusions for cyber war, and that some policies exclude “losses from outages of critical infrastructure services that are not under the control of the policyholder.” Worth a question, not a panic.

    Warranties and application representations. This is the one that quietly matters most. Applications commonly ask whether you have specific controls: multi-factor authentication on email and remote access, backups tested and kept separate from your main systems, procedures for verifying payment changes, endpoint protection, patching. Some policies convert those answers into conditions of coverage. An inaccurate answer — even one given in good faith by a volunteer treasurer who assumed MFA was on because someone once mentioned it — can give an insurer grounds to reduce or deny a claim, or to void the policy. So: whoever signs must confirm each answer with the person who actually administers the system, and keep a copy of exactly what the church attested to.

    How underwriting changed, and why that’s good news

    The market went through a hard correction. Insurers responded by raising rates, reducing limits for sectors they considered riskier, adding sublimits, and — most relevantly for you — looking much harder at applicants. GAO’s 2021 review reported that, according to industry representatives and reports, “underwriters have been more carefully scrutinizing the risks posed by all entities, regardless of size or sector.”

    From your side of the table, that means an application that asks real questions instead of taking your word for it — which sounds like an obstacle and is closer to an opportunity. Controls appear to be priced: reporting to GAO in 2021 put premiums “at about $1,400 to about $3,000 per million of limit for small entities that have strong cyber controls and are in low-risk industries,” and one broker expected renewal increases “more in the range of 5–10 percent for those with strong cyber controls” than for higher-risk entities. Those are 2021 figures from one market survey, not a quote for your church. Turning on multi-factor authentication is included at no extra cost on Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace and blocks, by Microsoft’s own measurement, more than 99.2% of account compromise attacks. Doing it before you apply may affect both what you pay and whether you’re offered terms at all — your broker can tell you how your carriers weigh it. And the questionnaire itself is a free gap analysis — whatever it asks about is, by definition, what the market has decided matters.

    One caution. Depth varies enormously; GAO found “no standard cybersecurity risk assessment across providers,” with smaller organizations sometimes answering as few as four questions. A short application doesn’t mean you’ve been assessed, and a clean one doesn’t mean you’re secure.

    The deadline nobody reads until it’s too late

    Cyber policies typically require prompt notice of a claim or circumstance, often within a specific and short window — sometimes measured in days. Late notice is a common reason for a claim to fail, and it collides badly with human nature: the instinct after discovering a loss is to spend a few days working out what happened before making calls. Those are frequently the days the policy expected you to use for notifying.

    So find your notice provision and write the deadline and the claims number on the front of the policy folder — and notify early, because most policies contemplate reporting a circumstance that might give rise to a claim, not only a confirmed loss.

    None of this changes the first call. If money has moved, you call the bank’s fraud line first and report to the FBI at ic3.gov the same day — the Bureau’s Recovery Asset Team froze $507,042,623 across 3,574 domestic cases in 2025, and that process depends almost entirely on speed. The insurer comes immediately after, not instead.

    Questions to ask your broker

    Take this to the meeting. There are no wrong answers — you’re gathering facts about your own policy.

    1. Do our current policies exclude cyber events, and has that language changed at recent renewals?
    2. Standalone cyber policy or an endorsement on the package, and what’s the total limit?
    3. Do we have social engineering or funds transfer fraud coverage? Separate endorsement? What sublimit?
    4. What must we have done before a payment for that coverage to respond — is call-back verification required?
    5. Does it respond if a volunteer, rather than an employee, was the one deceived?
    6. Which of these are covered, and at what sublimit: incident response and forensics, breach counsel, notification, credit monitoring, business interruption, data restoration, extortion?
    7. Does business interruption respond if our giving platform or church management vendor goes down?
    8. What controls does the policy warrant we maintain, and what did our last application say we had?
    9. What’s the notification deadline, what number do we call, and who is authorized to call it?
    10. What are the war and critical infrastructure exclusions, and what’s our deductible?

    Ask for the answers in writing, and file that email with the policy and the application.

    What to do this week

    Pull your current policies — all of them — and spend twenty minutes on the declarations pages looking for two things: the word cyber, and the words social engineering or fraudulent instruction.

    Then email your broker three of the questions above: whether you have social engineering or funds transfer fraud coverage, what its sublimit is, and what the policy requires you to have done before a payment went out. Ask for the reply in writing.

    Half an hour, no cost, and you’ll know whether your board’s assumption about being covered is accurate.

    Terms vary enormously between carriers, and two policies with the same name can behave completely differently. Nothing here is advice to buy a particular product, and none of it is legal advice. The only reliable answer comes from reading your own policy alongside your broker or attorney.

    MissionDefend’s free assessment covers many of the same control questions insurers now ask — how you handle email, donations, member data, and accounts — and returns a baseline score and a ranked list of what to fix first. Useful preparation for a renewal conversation.

    No spam and no sales calls — just one email when it’s live.


    MissionDefend provides cybersecurity readiness assessments and educational guidance for churches and nonprofits. It is not a penetration test, a security audit, legal advice, or an incident response service.

    Sources: U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cyber Insurance: Insurers and Policyholders Face Challenges in an Evolving Market (GAO-21-477); U.S. Government Accountability Office, Cyber Insurance: Action Needed to Assess Potential Federal Response to Catastrophic Attacks (GAO-22-104256); FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 Internet Crime Report; Microsoft, mandatory multifactor authentication guidance.

  • A One-Page Cybersecurity Policy Your Board Can Approve on a Tuesday

    A One-Page Cybersecurity Policy Your Board Can Approve on a Tuesday

    There is a binder on a shelf in the church office. The spine says Information Security Policy. Someone downloaded it in 2019, printed it, added tab dividers, and put it on the shelf, where it has remained.

    It is forty-one pages long. It references a Chief Information Security Officer, a quarterly vulnerability management cadence, and a data classification scheme with four tiers. The church has two full-time staff and a volunteer treasurer.

    Nobody has opened it. Not once. If you asked the office administrator what the policy says about wire transfers, she would tell you honestly that she has no idea.

    That binder is not neutral. It is worse than having nothing, because it lets everyone believe the question has been handled.

    The forty-page policy fails for a reason that has nothing to do with its contents

    The contents are usually fine. Somebody competent wrote them. The problem is structural.

    A policy is not a legal artifact. It is an instruction to human beings about what to do on a Tuesday afternoon when an email arrives asking for a payment change. If the instruction is on page 27 of a document nobody has read, it does not exist. The staff member acts on instinct instead, and instinct is exactly what the attacker is designing for.

    Long policies also fail in the other direction. They contain commitments the organization cannot keep — quarterly access audits, annual penetration testing, a security awareness training program — and once a policy contains one thing you obviously aren’t doing, the whole document loses its authority. People stop treating any of it as real.

    A single page that six people actually follow beats a binder that nobody opens. That is the whole argument, and it holds in organizations far larger than yours.

    So here is the page.

    The page

    Copy this. Change the bracketed parts. Do not add to it — the length is the feature.

    “`
    [CHURCH NAME] — INFORMATION SECURITY POLICY
    Adopted by the Board on [DATE]. Next review: [DATE + 1 YEAR].
    Policy owner: [NAME, ROLE].

    1. RESPONSIBILITY The Board is responsible for this policy. [NAME] is responsible for carrying it out and reports to the Board once a year on whether we are doing what this page says.
    1. MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION Multi-factor authentication is required on: church email, online banking, the giving/donation platform, the church management system, the payroll system, the website host, the domain registrar, and all social media accounts. No exceptions without written Board approval.
    1. VERIFYING MONEY Any request to send money, change bank details, change payroll direct deposit, or pay a new or altered invoice is verified by voice, on a phone number we already had on file — never a number supplied in the request — before the payment goes out. This applies however the request arrives, including from someone inside the organization.
    1. INDIVIDUAL LOGINS Every person has their own login. Logins and passwords are not shared, not with staff, not with volunteers, not with family members. Passwords are stored in the approved password manager, not on paper, in a spreadsheet, or in email.
    1. WHEN SOMEONE LEAVES When any staff member or volunteer stops serving in a role, their access to every account and building is removed within 14 days. [NAME] runs this from the account inventory and confirms it in writing. This applies to everyone, including clergy and Board members.
    1. BACKUPS Church data — financial records, member records, and documents — is backed up automatically, with at least one copy the church controls and that cannot be altered from a staff computer. Once a year we restore a real file from backup to prove the backup works, and note the date it was tested.
    1. IF SOMETHING LOOKS WRONG If you think you clicked a bad link, entered a password on the wrong page, sent money to the wrong place, or noticed anything unusual in an account: stop, and tell [NAME] and [BACKUP NAME] immediately, by phone. Do not wait to be sure. If money has moved, we call the bank first and report to the FBI at ic3.gov the same day.
    1. NO PENALTY FOR REPORTING No one will be disciplined, dismissed, or embarrassed for reporting a mistake or a suspicion, including their own mistake, and including after money has been lost. Reporting quickly is the behavior this church wants. Hiding a mistake is the only thing that gets anyone in trouble.
    1. REVIEW The Board reviews this policy once a year, on or before [DATE]. “`

    That is the entire policy. It fits on one sheet, single-sided.

    What each clause is doing, so you can defend it

    Your board will ask about some of these. Here is the one-sentence answer for each.

    Responsibility. A policy with no name attached is a wish; naming one person and one annual report is what turns it into something that actually happens.

    Multi-factor authentication. Multi-factor authentication — MFA — is the extra step after your password: a code, a tap on your phone, a key. Microsoft’s own research finds it blocks more than 99.2% of account compromise attacks, and naming the specific systems matters because churches routinely turn it on for email and forget the giving platform, which is the one holding donor card details.

    Verifying money. This is the single clause most likely to save you real money, because the fraud that actually hits churches is a convincing email asking for a payment change; a thirty-second phone call to a number you already had defeats every version of it.

    Individual logins. Shared logins make it impossible to know who did what, impossible to remove one person’s access without disrupting everyone, and impossible to use MFA properly.

    When someone leaves. Old accounts are the quietest risk you have — nobody is watching them, and their passwords are often years old and reused elsewhere; a defined window turns “we should get around to that” into a date. CISA’s guidance for small organizations puts it plainly: develop procedures addressing changes in user status, and eliminate shared and unused accounts.

    Backups. A backup you have never restored is a theory, and the annual restore test is what converts it into a fact — this is also the clause that determines whether a ransomware incident is a bad week or an extinction event.

    If something looks wrong. Most losses become large because somebody waited; naming two people and requiring a phone call removes the ambiguity about who to tell and how.

    No penalty for reporting. Speed is the only thing that reliably recovers money, and speed depends entirely on whether a frightened person feels safe telling you within the hour rather than on Monday.

    Review. A date on the page is what stops this becoming the 2019 binder.

    Getting it adopted on a Tuesday

    The mistake is presenting this as a debate. It is not a debate; it is a housekeeping item that happens to be important.

    Put it on the consent agenda. Consent items are approved as a block without discussion unless a member pulls one. Circulate the page with the board packet a week ahead, with a two-sentence cover note: This replaces our existing information security policy. It is one page so that staff and volunteers will actually follow it. Most boards will pass it without comment, which is the correct outcome.

    Name the owner before the meeting, not during it. An unassigned policy will sit for a year. Ask the person first, privately, so the name in the document is already agreed.

    Set the review date as a real date. Not “annually.” A date, in the calendar, on the same board meeting each year.

    Record it in the minutes. This is the part people skip, and it is the part that matters most beyond the security question.

    Boards of nonprofit organizations carry a duty of care — the general obligation to act with the attention a reasonably prudent person would apply to the organization’s affairs. The specifics vary by state and by your governing documents, and this is not legal advice; ask your attorney what applies to you. But the general shape is consistent: what a board can demonstrate matters. A minute that reads the Board adopted the Information Security Policy, assigned responsibility to the Business Administrator, and set the annual review for the March meeting is evidence that the board considered the risk and acted. A verbal agreement that somebody should look into cybersecurity is not.

    Give a copy to every person it applies to. Staff, yes — but also the volunteer who runs the website, the volunteer counting team, the person with the Facebook password. One page can be handed to someone in a hallway. Forty-one pages cannot.

    Policy without practice is theatre

    Here is the honest limitation. Adopting this page does not mean your church is prepared. It means your church has written down what it intends to do.

    The gap between those two things is real, and it shows up under pressure. The staff member who has read clause 3 in a board packet is not the same as the staff member who has actually made the verification call once and knows it takes thirty seconds and is not awkward. The person named in clause 7 is not ready until they have said the words out loud in a room, with a scenario in front of them.

    The way to close that gap is a tabletop exercise — a short, low-stakes practice run where you talk through a realistic incident around a table and find out who would actually do what. It takes under an hour and it is the subject of its own post in this series. If you adopt the policy and never practice it, you have documentation. If you adopt it and practice it once a year, you have a response.

    Do the page first anyway. Documentation you follow beats intention you never wrote down.

    What to do this week

    Copy the page above into a document, fill in the five bracketed fields — church name, policy owner, backup contact, adoption date, review date — and email it to whoever assembles the board packet with a request to add it to the consent agenda.

    Then, separately, check one thing before the meeting: whether MFA is actually turned on for the giving platform and the church management system, not just email. If it isn’t, you will want to know that before you sign a document saying it is required.

    Thirty minutes, no budget, and your board has a defensible record by the end of the month.

    If you would like something concrete to bring to the same board meeting, MissionDefend’s free assessment asks plain-English questions about how your organization handles email, donations, member data, and accounts, then returns a baseline score and a ranked list of what to fix first — useful as the evidence behind the annual report clause 1 asks for.

    No spam and no sales calls — just one email when it’s live.


    MissionDefend provides cybersecurity readiness assessments and educational guidance for churches and nonprofits. It is not a penetration test, a security audit, legal advice, or an incident response service.

    Sources: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, Cyber Essentials Starter Kit; Microsoft, mandatory multifactor authentication guidance; FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 Internet Crime Report.

  • The Board Member on the Call Wasn’t Real

    The Board Member on the Call Wasn’t Real

    The finance committee meets at seven on Thursday, on video, the way it has since 2020. Four squares on the screen. The treasurer joins eight minutes late, apologises, says the audio on his end is bad, and keeps his camera on anyway.

    He’s brief. The contractor for the roof project needs the deposit moved tonight to hold the crew for next month — the account details came through this afternoon and he’s forwarded them to the administrator. He asks whether anyone objects. Nobody does. His camera freezes twice while he’s talking, which is completely normal on a church Wi-Fi connection, and which is also the reason nobody looks too closely.

    The treasurer was at his daughter’s recital that evening and did not attend the meeting.

    What a deepfake actually is

    Deepfake is a plain word wearing a technical costume. It means a fake image, video, or audio recording generated by software that has studied real recordings of a person until it can produce new ones — a video of someone saying something they never said, or a voice speaking words the person never spoke.

    There’s no mystery in it and nothing exotic. The software needs examples of the person, and it produces convincing new material from them. The more examples it has, the better the result.

    The two forms that matter to a church are different in maturity, and it’s worth being precise about which is which, because the difference determines how you should think about the risk.

    Where the technology actually is

    Synthetic voice is here, it is cheap, and it is fast. This is the mature threat. Software that clones a voice from a short sample is widely available and requires no skill to operate. The FBI’s public warning on generative AI fraud describes criminals using AI-generated audio to impersonate people — a relative in a crisis asking for immediate financial help, or an account holder calling their own bank — in order to extract funds or gain access to accounts. If a caller’s voice sounds exactly like your finance chair, that no longer tells you anything.

    We’ll cover voice cloning on its own in a later post, because it deserves the room.

    Live synthetic video on a call is real but harder. This is where it’s easy to overstate, so here are the actual facts of the best-documented case.

    In January 2024, an employee at Arup — a London-headquartered engineering and design firm — joined a video conference at the company’s Hong Kong office with people who appeared to be the chief financial officer and other colleagues. They were digital recreations. Over the following week the employee made fifteen transfers totalling HK$200 million, roughly US$25 million. Hong Kong police disclosed the case in February 2024, and Arup confirmed in May 2024 that it had been the victim, with a spokesperson saying the firm notified police in January.

    That is one very large fraud against a global firm with thousands of employees, and it should be read as a demonstration rather than as a description of what happens on a typical Tuesday. The everyday version of this attack is still a plain email or a phone call. But the Arup case establishes something that is no longer arguable: a video call is not proof of who you are talking to.

    The FBI’s guidance reflects the same conclusion, noting that criminals generate AI video to depict executives and authority figures in real-time chats or to lend credibility in private communication.

    Why a church is unusually exposed

    Voice cloning needs reference material. Consider what your organization publishes, on purpose, every single week.

    Sermons. Livestreamed services, archived and public. Podcast episodes. Announcement videos. Staff introduction clips on the website. A capital campaign video with the board chair speaking directly to camera for three minutes.

    Most small businesses have almost nothing like this. A church typically has hours of clean, well-recorded audio of its most authoritative voices, freely downloadable, indexed and organized by name.

    None of that is a reason to stop. The livestream is ministry, and taking it down to prevent a hypothetical fraud would be trading something real for something speculative. The right response is not to publish less. It is to stop treating a familiar voice as identification — because for your organization specifically, a familiar voice is public information.

    The rest of the reference material is public too. Your board members are listed on your website or in your 990 filing. Your bank is on your checks. Your building project is in the newsletter. A fraudster does not need to research you; they need to read you.

    The rule that works no matter how good the fake is

    Everything above is about how convincing the impersonation can be. The control below doesn’t care.

    A decision to move money is never made on a call. It is confirmed on a channel the requester did not choose.

    Sit with that second sentence, because it’s the load-bearing part. If the request came in on a video call, confirmation happens by phone. If it came by phone, confirmation happens by a text to the number in your records, or in person, or on a second call you place. The attacker controls the channel they contacted you through — that’s the one thing you can be certain of. So verification has to happen somewhere else.

    This is the same money rule that runs through everything else on this blog: any change to payment details is verified by voice, on a number you already had, before the payment goes out. The deepfake era changes exactly one thing about it. Voice alone is no longer sufficient confirmation. The channel is doing the verifying now, not the sound of the person.

    Three specific mechanisms make that rule practical.

    A shared verbal passphrase for leadership. Agree on a word or short phrase, in person, among the small group of people who can authorize payments — pastor, treasurer, board chair, administrator. It is never written in email, never stored in a shared drive, never said on a video call. When a request to move money arrives from a person rather than a process, the recipient asks for it. The FBI recommends exactly this technique for families targeted by AI voice fraud: “Create a secret word or phrase with your family to verify their identity.” A leadership team is the same idea with a different roster.

    Pick something unguessable and unGoogleable. Not the church’s founding year, not the pastor’s dog. A random pair of words is ideal, and you should agree in advance that anyone may ask for it without it being awkward, including from the senior person in the room.

    A callback rule. No payment instruction is executed on the strength of the call it arrived on. The administrator hangs up, dials the number already in the personnel file or the vendor contract, and confirms. It adds ten minutes and defeats the entire category.

    Dual approval above a threshold. Pick a dollar figure appropriate to your budget and require two named people to approve anything above it — with the second approval given through a channel other than the one the request came in on. This is the control that survives even when the first person is completely fooled, and it’s why it belongs in your written policy rather than in someone’s habits.

    Write all three down. A control that lives only in the treasurer’s head disappears the moment the treasurer is on vacation, which is the week the request will arrive.

    Tells on a live call, and why they expire

    If you find yourself on a call and something is off, there are things worth trying.

    Ask the person to turn their head fully to one side, or to stand up and step back from the camera. Current systems handle a straight-on face far better than a sharp profile or an unusual angle, and artifacts often appear at the edges — around the ears, the jawline, the hairline, or where hair meets background.

    Ask them to hold a hand up beside their face. Hands are still difficult.

    Better than either: ask something only the real person would know, and make it specific and recent. Not “what’s our budget” — anything published is available. Ask what they ordered at lunch on Tuesday, or what the sanctuary thermostat has been doing, or the name of the person who fixed the parking lot lights. A synthetic impersonation is usually driven by someone reading from research, and research does not include last Tuesday’s lunch.

    Now the honest caveat, which matters more than the tips: these tells are expiring. Every one of them exists because the technology has a current limitation, and current limitations do not stay current. Head turns will get better. Hands will get better. The list above may be substantially useless in two years, and there is no version of it that stays reliable.

    That’s not a reason to skip them. It’s the reason the procedure matters more than the perception. A passphrase and a callback rule work identically whether the fake is crude or flawless, because they never ask anyone to judge how real something looks. They’re the only part of this article with a shelf life.

    If it already happened

    Move fast; recovery is a race measured in hours.

    Call your bank’s fraud line first, before anything else, and ask them to attempt a recall. Wire transfers are hardest to reverse and ACH transfers sometimes possible — either way, the first hour matters more than everything you do afterward.

    Report to the FBI at ic3.gov, and say business email compromise even if the request arrived by video, because that’s the category the Bureau’s recovery process runs on. The FBI’s Recovery Asset Team ran 3,574 domestic cases in 2025 and froze $507,042,623, and that process works dramatically better inside the first 24 to 72 hours.

    Tell your board and your insurer the same day. Many policies have prompt-notice requirements, and a delay can affect coverage.

    Then look at the mailbox. These attacks are frequently preceded by someone reading email inside your organization for weeks. Change passwords from a different device, sign out all sessions, enable multi-factor authentication if it isn’t on, and check every mailbox for forwarding rules nobody remembers creating.

    For scale: the FBI logged 24,768 business email compromise complaints in 2025, with losses of $3,046,598,558 — an average of about $123,005 per report. This is where the money in fraud actually goes, and a synthetic voice or face is simply a new way to open the same door.

    What to do this week

    Choose a passphrase with your leadership team — pastor, treasurer, board chair, administrator — in person or on a call where you can see each other, and agree it is never written down or emailed. Then send one message to whoever executes payments, in your own words: no payment or change of payment details goes out on the strength of a call, however convincing. Hang up, call the number we already have, confirm.

    That’s twenty minutes, and unlike every visual tell in this article, it doesn’t stop working next year.

    Procedures are what hold up when the technology stops helping you tell real from fake. MissionDefend’s free assessment asks plain-English questions about how your organization approves payments, handles email, and manages accounts, then returns a baseline score and a ranked list of what to fix first — including whether your money controls depend on someone recognizing a voice.

    No spam and no sales calls — just one email when it’s live.


    MissionDefend provides cybersecurity readiness assessments and educational guidance for churches and nonprofits. It is not a penetration test, a security audit, legal advice, or an incident response service.

    Sources: FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, Criminals Use Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Financial Fraud; South China Morning Post, UK multinational Arup confirmed as victim of HK$200 million deepfake scam; CNN, Arup revealed as victim of $25 million deepfake scam involving Hong Kong employee; FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 Internet Crime Report.